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ABSTRACT
The threat of inserting hardware Trojans during the design, produc-
tion, or in-field poses a danger for integrated circuits in real-world
applications. A particular critical case of hardware Trojans is the
malicious manipulation of third-party FPGA configurations. In ad-
dition to attack vectors during the design process, FPGAs can be
infiltrated in a non-invasive manner after shipment through alter-
ations of the bitstream. First, we present an improved methodology
for bitstream file format reversing. Second, we introduce a novel
idea for Trojan insertion.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Hardware reverse engineering;Ma-
licious design modifications; Embedded systems security;
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1 INTRODUCTION
The threat of Intellectual Property (IP) theft, imposed by hardware
reverse engineering, has been historically considered as the main
practical security issue. The move from on-site fabrication to a glob-
ally distributed supply-chain and the arising threats of interdiction
changed this perspective significantly for all kind of applications.
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Since the Snowden’s surveillance revelations, malicious hard-
waremanipulations became an increasing concern, including SRAM-
based Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Due to the volatile
nature of SRAM-based FPGAs, new attack vectors arise such as
bitstream interception and manipulation. A prerequisite for those
kinds of attacks is to reverse engineer the bitstream file formats. For
this reason and to support highly customisable bitstream genera-
tion tools, various research works [3, 5, 7, 8, 14–18, 24, 28] aimed at
reverse engineering the proprietary bitstream file format of SRAM-
based FPGAs, which mainly focused on Xilinx FPGAs.
However, today it is not possible to fully reverse the entire bit-
stream format of Xilinx FPGAs which reveals all the details of a
specific hardware configuration. Hence, there is no official support
for developing open source bitstream generation tools similar to
Project IceStorm [27], which reversed the Lattice iCE40 FPGAs.
Such a tool improves the flexibility for designers and researchers,
i.e., it could extend (security) frameworks like HAL [6], Torc [19],
or RapidSmith [9].
Knowing the entire bitstream file format, the security of cryp-
tographic hardware configuration can be appropriately analyzed.
Thus quick-and-easy malicious bitstream manipulation attacks [1,
4, 20–22], leading to a potential security breach, can be pentested
beforehand and accordingly addressed by a security analyst. De-
fending of FPGA designs is even more crucial since most FPGA
bitstream encryption schemes of older FPGA generations are vul-
nerable to side-channel attacks [10–13, 23] or do not offer any
bitstream encryption/authentication at all. Hence the hardware
layout reverse engineering and manipulation of bitstreams are a
real threat. Notably, many old systems used in large infrastructures
deploy hundreds of (older) FPGA devices. Newer hardware modules
cannot simply replace them due to high costs or environmental rea-
sons. Hence, considering the long life span [2] of (older) deployed
SRAM-based FPGAs, it is always worthwhile to explore the practical
doability of bitstream reverse engineering, hardware design reverse
engineering, and the corresponding potential malicious hardware
manipulations, cf. Wallat et al. [26]. All those methods need to be
understood well, as they are crucial for improving the security of
critical systems. Summarizing bitstream reverse engineering can
be used for illegitimate and legitimate purposes.
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The main issue of bitstream file format reverse engineering and
a meaningful hardware configuration manipulation is a seemingly
complicated and time-consuming practical task. In general, it is
unclear to what extent an attacker can use a non-perfect converted
netlist from a bitstream to inject a hardware Trojan into it.
In this work, we provide insights into bitstream reverse engi-
neering techniques and Trojan insertion strategies at the hardware
configuration level. Our contribution is as follows.
(1) We present an improved methodology for bitstream file for-
mat reversing targeting its routing encoding. Moreover, it
is capable of extracting the bitstream encoding rules for
Programmable Interconnect Points (PIPs), Look-Up Tables
(LUTs), and Flip Flops (FFs), which we exemplarily con-
ducted for a Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA. Additionally, our frame-
work manipulates bitstreams, e.g., it can replace LUT config-
urations and set/unset single PIPs.
(2) We introduce a new method for a hardware Trojan insertion
into a self-test-protected AES IP core at the hardware config-
uration level. This gives an idea of how advanced attacker
may perform malicious hardware configuration manipula-
tions.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly introduce the needed background on
SRAM-based FPGAs, which is necessary to fully comprehend the
bitstream reversing and manipulation methods presented within
this paper. For an in-depth description of FPGAs, we refer the
interested reader to [25].
The Spartan-6 has a two-dimensional array structure, where
SLICEs encounter the LUTs and FFs. Two SLICES and an adjacent
switch matrix form one Configurable Logik Block (CLB), as this is
depicted in Figure 1. The switch matrix realizes the interconnection
logic of the FPGA by configuring so-called PIPs.
Switch
Matrix 
Configurable
Logic Block
Slice
Programmable
Interconnect
Point 
Wires
Figure 1: Part of configured FPGA internals showing a
switch matrix, a NET, and a SLICE.
As indicated by Figure 1, PIPs are configurable wires within
a switch matrix that connect static wires with other static wires.
Hence, they allow building specific bridges between wires. Since
the PIPs are reprogrammable, the information must be stored in
the proprietary bitstream files. Generally speaking, the PIPs realize
the actual routing functionality of an FPGA.
Furthermore, a dedicated signal with a defined source and sink
is called a NET. Sources and sinks are for example the LUT’s input
or FF’s output. The PIPs realize the NETs’ routing from a dedicated
source to its sinks, i.e., an FF’s output is routed via several PIPs to a
LUT’s input. Thus, when knowing all potential PIP configurations,
the NETs can be reconstructed.
Finally, we shortly note that the bitstream is an encoded ver-
sion of the placed and routed XDL netlist file. We refer to this
information as hardware configuration.
3 BITSTREAM REVERSE ENGINEERING
We divide the reverse engineering process into two phases; the (1)
bitstream reverse engineering and (2) bitstream conversion phase.
The first phase determines the relation between all bits in the
bitstream and the associated hardware configuration of a specific
FPGAmodel. The result of the first step is a database containing the
mapping of a single bitstream’s bit and its impact on the hardware
configuration of a hardware primitive such as FFs, multiplexers,
PIPs, or LUTs.
In the second phase, a targeted bitstream is converted back into
a human-readable netlist representation by using the previously
created database. The resulting gate-level netlist (or: XDL file) can
then be processed by officially supported tools such as the ISE suite
and FPGA Editor from Xilinx or by unofficially supported tools
like RapidSmith [9]. With this step, the before unknown targeted
bitstream’s hardware configuration is revealed. Thus, it can be for
example further processed by a reverse engineer.
The reverse engineering of the information that encodes the rout-
ing within a bitstream was already depicted in [5], but we provide
an improved methodology for the Xilinx Spartan-6 Series. In partic-
ular, we were successful for the 6slx16csg324 and 6slx75csg484
FPGAs. Our approach simplifies and speeds up the entire bitstream
reverse-engineering process. For reverse-engineering and verifica-
tion purposes, we used the Xilinx ISE Suite 14.7.
3.1 Phase 1: Bitstream Reversing
Our tool for reversing the bitstream creates a database containing
the mapping between most configurable FPGA resources and its
configuration bits in the bitstream. In the following, we focus on
the PIP reversing, but the methodology is also applicable to other
FPGA components. Note that we reversed LUTs, flip-flops, and
multiplexers as well, but we do not provide futher details. Our
approach works as follows.
(1) Creation of a minimalistic template (XDL netlist) that either
configures a single hardware elements, e.g., a PIP.
(2) Generation of a reference bitstream which encodes support-
ive instances regarding the template of Step 1.
(3) Conducting template alterations followed by bitstream gen-
eration and bit toggle observation.
(4) Database creation.
To correlate the configuration of FPGA resources with the bit-
stream bits, we created specific crafted XDL netlist templates (Step 1)
that are translated by the vendors tool to a bitstream (Step 2). Note
that for each FPGA element, an individual template is needed, e.g,
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PIPs require a different template than LUTs. During Step 3, the
configuration of the templates are slightly modified and another
bitstream is generated, again using the vendors tool. The resulting
change of both generated bitstream files are recorded into a data-
base (Step 4). For bitstream creation, we used the Xilinx tools xdl
and bitgen as follows.
• xdl -xdl2ncd -force empty.xdl // creates an NCD file
• bitgen -d empty.ncd // creates the corresponding bitstream
By using the -force and -d option, this enables us to generate
bitstreams even though the hardware configuration itself is an
illegitimate design.
Note that some targeted hardware elements require the configu-
ration of other hardware elements. Otherwise, the vendor’s tools
do not manipulate the bitstream files accordingly. This is an issue
that we faced ourselves when we tried to reverse engineer the bit-
stream encoding for one PIP configuration. It is not sufficient to
only configure a PIP within a NET, but one needs to attach the NET
to other instances. Listing 1 exemplary shows an XDL template
that generates a valid bitstream containing information about the
PIP configuration.
1 design "basic_pip" xc6slx16csg324 -3 v3.2;
2 inst "q" "IOB",placed BIOB_X11Y0 T8;
3 inst "q_OBUF" "OLOGIC2",placed BIOI_OUTER_X11Y0
OLOGIC_X8Y0;
4 net "q_OBUF" ,
5 outpin "q_OBUF" OQ ,
6 inpin "q" O ,
7 pip INT_X10Y6 WW2E2 -> NL1B2 ;
Listing 1: XDL template for one PIP configuration (WW2E2
→ NL1B2) of the switch matrix INT_X10Y16
We first reverse engineer the routing encoding of one switch
matrix and later on simplify the process for all other available ones.
In our example (cf. Listing 1), we target the switch matrix labeled
as INT_X10Y16. In line 4, a NET is instanciated containing the
examined PIP (WW2E2→ NL1N2) in line 7. To our surprise, we
found out that it is just necessary to specify two arbitrary chosen
instances (line 2 and 3) that are supposed to be connected with
the NET’s OUTPIN and INPIN, even if the NET does not route
such connectivity. Hence, there is no need to worry about finding
and connecting the NET to valid instances, which eases the entire
reverse engineering task significantly.
Additionally, thanks to the -force and -d parameters, the bit-
stream generation tools nevertheless encode the PIP’s information
into the resulting bitstream even though our specified instance and
NET connectivity are not necessarily correct. If the two arbitrary
chosen instances are missing in the XDL template, the PIP’s con-
figuration is not encoded into the bitstream file even though the
specified NET itself is valid.
Since we instantiate two additional instances which are not
associated with the PIP, its configuration is undesirably encoded
into every generated bitstream file. This information can be easily
removed by letting the vendors tool generate a reference bitstream
file (only once) that does only encode both instances (line 2 and 3)
without the NET in Listing 1, i.e., Step 2.
The difference between any generated bitstream (instances plus
NET with individual PIP) and the one-time generated reference bit-
stream (with instances only) reveals the correct bitstream encoding
of an individual PIP configuration. Hence, both bitstreams simply
need to be XORed.
Which PIPs are available for a switch-matrix configuration, can
be figured out quickly by parsing the information from so-called
XDL report files that can be easily generated, cf. [3]. For every
possible PIP the template is changed, e.g., Line 7 is replaced with
another examined PIP and the corresponding bitstream is generated.
Further note that in cases where a PIP configuration does not
lead to any bit toggle in the bitstream, we mark it as a default
configuration. During our reverse engineering efforts, this only
happened for a fraction of all PIPs (under 1% of all PIPs).
The presented PIP reversing approach of Ding et al. [5] re-
lies on i) creating NETs with multiple PIPs and on ii) conducting
further pre- and postprocessing steps. As opposed to that, our ap-
proach minimizes the required pre- and postprocessing steps and
hence can be carried out faster and in a less complicated manner. It
also does require less knowledge about the FPGA internals.
Note that by applying the described approach of [5], we can also
reduce the time for reversing the bitstream and the file size of the
database. This works by exploiting the repetitiveness of hardware
elements distributed over the FPGA’s grid structure.
Most switch matrices are of the same type, i.e., they contain
the same labeled PIPs. Moreover, the byte distances among the
configuration bits from different PIPs are always equally distributed
within one switch matrix type. Exemplarily, the configuration bits
of the first and second PIP could always be separated by k byte
positions, which would apply to (most) switch matrices. This was
described by Ding et al. [5].
We were able to verify this, as we have also reversed various
switch matrices with different locations on the FPGA grid for veri-
fication purposes. As expected, the bitstream encoding yielded the
same distances. Additionally, the routing of all our tested FPGA
designs could be later on correctly recovered. A sample design re-
covery for the routing of an AES IP core is depicted in Figure 2.
Our recovered netlist only lacks the clock tree information which
is work in progress. Otherwise, the recovered routing information
is complete.
Once all PIPs of a single switch matrix are reverse engineered
(revealing all distances), it is sufficient to only generate one bit-
stream for every remaining unreversed switch matrix in the FPGA.
Each of those bitstreams encodes the configuration of a chosen
fixed reference PIP.
To calculate the positions of the remaining unreversed PIPs of a
switch matrix, the offset of the fixed reference PIP is added with the
corresponding previously derived PIP distance. Each PIP position
can be hence simply computed with
PIP_position = re f erence_PIP_position + PIP_distance (1)
Given that we have to reverse-engineer one switch matrix with
3461 possible PIPs (distance PIPs) and there are only 2278 switch
matices (reference pips), we just need to generate 5739 = 3461+2278
bitstreams to derive a complete list of most available PIPs.
A straight-forward attempt to reverse most PIPs of all switch
matrices individually would make the required reverse-engineering
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(a) Routing information of the original hardware configuration as it
is generated by the vendors tools.
(b) Extracted routing information from the bitstream. The conversion
was carried out with our framework.
Figure 2: Routing comparison between the original and the converted AES IP core.
time practically infeasible: when considering that a bitstream gen-
eration plus its processing (single threaded) takes ∼7 seconds on an
average machine (i7-7700HQ, 3.8GHz, 4 cores, 8 threads) and that
there are approx. ∼5.5 million possible PIPs on a Spartan-6 (6slx16),
the sequential bitstream generation of all 5.5 million bitstreams
would take approximately ∼381 days.
As opposed to that, it took us only approximately 21.5 hours to
reverse engineer the entire routing encoding by following the dis-
tance approach of Ding. We also implemented a parallelized version
with 8 threads and could further reduce the reverse engineering
time to ∼2.6 hours.
Once we have generated all bitstreams, where each bitstream
encodes the configuration of a chosen fixed reference PIP for one
switch-matrix, we derive a database (Step 4) that stores all those
reference byte positions. Additionally, we store the distance pat-
terns for all PIPs that can later on be used to reconstruct the exact
byte and bit positions (Equation 1) for any queried switch matrix.
3.2 Phase 2: Bitstream Conversion
For Phase 2, we have created a bitstream converter and manipula-
tion framework which uses the previously generated database. It is
capable of converting a targeted bitstream back to its partial XDL
netlist representation, e.g., routing, flip-flops, MUXs, and LUTs. Ad-
ditionally, it is capable of modifying LUTs and PIPs directly in the
bitstream, e.g., it can manipulate the Boolean LUT equations and
set/unset PIPs in any arbitrary switch matrix. Figure 3 shows the
architecture of our developed tool, which is written in C++. During
development, we used a modular architecture allowing to support
new FPGA devices and features, e.g., to support the conversion of
BRAM or IO blocks.
Database Wrapper
XDL Writer
Bitstream WrapperBitstram Converter BitstreamManipulator
Hardware Conf.
Wrapper
Figure 3: Architecture of our bitstream framework.
We describe all modules as follows.
• The database wrapper parses the previously created data-
base and provides an interface to it. It stores all information
regarding the mapping of bitstream bits to a hardware con-
figuration.
• Similarly, the bitstream wrapper parses the targeted - to
be converted - bitstream. The targeted bitstream is XORed
with a generated reference bitstream that encodes an empty
hardware configuration. This eliminates unwanted default
configuration bits.
• The hardware configuration information, e.g., a list of PIP
objects, is stored into the hardware configuration wrapper,
which can be accessed by the XDL writer.
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• The XDL writer is responsible for generating valid XDL code
from the available information of the hardware configuration
wrapper.
In the following, we discuss the bitstream reverser class in greater
detail, as it is mainly responsible for correctly extracting the hard-
ware configuration from a targeted bitstream. Algorithm 1 describes
the entire extraction workflow.
Data: bitstreamWrapper* bs, database* db, configurationWrapper* c
begin
/* Iterate over every bit of the bitstream */
for bitPos = bs−>getSyncWordPos() to bs−>bitstreamLength() do
/* Check if the bit is set and marked */
if bs->getBit(bitPos) == 1 and !marked then
/* Search for a suitable object in the db */
DataObject* obj ←
db−>GetElementFromDatabase(bitPos);
if obj != nullptr then
/* If an object is found, process it
further depending on its type */
type← obj−>getType();
if type == PIP then
/* Reverse the PIP */
mostBitsToggled← 0;
usedPIP← nullptr;
for PIP p : db−>getLinkedPIPs(bitPos) do
if bs->bitsToggled(p−>getToggledBits())
then
if mostBitsToggled <
p−>getNumToggledBits() then
mostBitsToggled←
p−>getNumToggledBits();
usedPIP← p;
end
end
end
if usedPIP != nullptr then
/* set usedPIP in the config */
c−>addPIP(p);
end
else if type == lutBit then
/* Reverse the LUT Bit */
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Bitstream conversion algorithm needed for ex-
tracting PIP configurations from a targeted bitstream.
As can be seen, the algorithm iterates over every single set bit
from the targeted bitstream for which the bitstream wrapper re-
moved the disturbing default bits in a previous processing step.
Depending on the bit’s position, our database assigns it to the
correct bits’ object type, e.g., PIPs, MUXs, or LUTs as well as to the
correct location on the two-dimensional FPGA grid. Then it stores
the returned information in the hardware configuration wrapper.
Since the reconstruction of LUTs is for example already explained
in [16, 22, 28], we only describe the reconstruction of PIPs in fur-
ther detail, as its conversion to a correct PIPs’ object list requires
appropriate processing.
A switch matrix of an FPGA contains multiple sinks and sources.
From now on, we only consider one sink, e.g., a PIP. Depending on
the type, N configurable sources are wired with the PIP, cf. Fig. 4,
but only one valid PIP connection can be routed through the sink
at the same time, cf. Figure 4.
T
I
E
...
PIP
possible connections
(a) With all possible connections for one sink
T
I
E
...PIP
source wire
sink wire
(b) With one configured PIP
Figure 4: Upper part of a switch matrix
Roughly speaking, a PIP acts like a multiplexer. The configu-
ration of which source is routed through the PIP is stored in the
bitstream. Such an N-to-1-multiplexer requires at least ⌈loд2(N )⌉
control bits, but we observed that the bitstream stores more than
⌈loд2(N )⌉ bits (without further explanation). The fact that a single
PIP share multiple configuration bits and these bits are not stored
continuously complicates the bitstream conversion task. To address
this, we have developed Algorithm 1.
0 1 00000 1 1 0
PIP A 
PIP B PIP C 
Figure 5: Possible distribution of PIP’s configuration bits
within a bitstream. If all arrows of a PIP point to only set
bits and if it has the most bits set, the corresponding PIP is
configured. If any outgoing arrow of a PIP points to at least
one cleared bit, then the PIP is obviously not configured.
As indicated before, our tool iterates over each bit in the targeted
pre-processed bitstream. If the algorithm encounters a PIP configu-
ration bit, it yields a set of possible PIPs and iterates over each PIP
candidate. It then successfully figures out, which PIP is the correct
candiate, cf. the caption of Figure 5 or Algorithm 1.
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In the shown example of Figure 5, our tool processes the most-
left set PIP configuration bit. In this case, the database will return
PIP A, PIP B, and PIP C as potential configured PIPs. Since one bit
for PIP C is cleared, our algorithm discards this candidate. As a
valid PIP requires to have set all configuration bits. Even though
this is the case for PIP B, it will be discarded as well, since all
configuration bits of PIP A are set and the Hamming weight of
PIP A is the largest one. Therefore, in this toy example PIP A is the
correct PIP candidate.
Additionally, once we have reconstructed all configured PIP bits
within a bitstream, we convert back all set NETs. For this purpose,
we have re-implemented the described ICG algorithm from Ding et
al. [5].
3.3 Bitstream Manipulator
Note that we started to implement a bitstream manipulator to avoid
the need for a complete bitstream conversion. So far, our frame-
work is capable of setting or unsetting PIPs and changing Boolean
functions in LUTs. This allows us to carry out targeted bitstream
manipulations for which we do not possess the fully reverse en-
gineered XDL netlist. Therefore, we do not rely on the vendor’s
tools, e.g., xdl and bitgen. They usually require a complete XDL
netlist to ensure the intended functionality of a hardware configura-
tion. In the future, we plan to enhance our bitstream manipulation
capabilities further.
Having introduced our capabilities, we now describe how a Tro-
jan may be inserted into a targeted selftest-protected AES IP core.
4 CASE STUDY: TROJAN INSERTION
Only little is known about how a Trojan designer may exactly pro-
ceed to tamper a third-party hardware configuration. This case
study demonstrates a possible Trojan insertion methodology into
an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) IP core at hardware con-
figuration level. Note that in practice such Trojan requires to either
develop or use a tool that can
• convert the bitstream file format to a gate-level netlist, cf. Sec-
tion 1 and 3
• manipulate the underlying hardware primitives without vio-
lating any timing constraints.
• perform correct bitstream file patching
In the field, a bitstream manipulation is possible during various
life-cycle phases of a device, i.e., it can be intercepted during ship-
ment, during selling, or even during operation from the customer
himself. Even though we did not test the following manipulations
directly on the bitstream, we provide a new idea of how an attacker
can proceed to manipulate a placed and routed hardware configu-
ration where only partial information is available, i.e.., we assume
that a third-party bitstream was partially converted. This is a real-
istic assumption1 for most deployed embedded devices, where the
bitstream is usually stored in plaintext on the same PCB along with
the targeted FPGA. We used the HAL framework [6] to identify
and manipulate the relevant netlist components. From our result,
we are confident that a hardware configuration must not be fully
1It is likely that state actors are able to obtain all data from a bitstream, but we
nevertheless try to explore the actual practical capabilities of weaker attackers who
only possess partial information
known to also accomplish more complicated Trojan insertions at a
very late stage.
4.1 Target and Notation
Our targeted AES-128 IP core provides an interface to set a key
for data decryption and encryption. To interact with the circuit
we integrated an Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
(UART)/RS-232 interface. Further, we use the following notations:
p - Plaintext (16 bytes), k - Key (16 bytes), c = AESk (p) - Ciphertext
(16 bytes), (pref, cref) - Plaintext/ciphertext pair for the self-test, kst
- Key for the self-test, ku - Key for user data.
4.2 System Model
We assume that an FPGA and an external entity, e.g., a dedicated
microprocessor, are integrated on the same embedded system along
with an FPGA-based AES accelerator in a bitstream. The workflow
is as follows:
(1) After the FPGA is configured with the AES IP core, the ex-
ternal entity conducts a self-test with the FPGA by setting
the self-test key kst and the reference plaintext pref.
(2) The external entity analyzes the FPGA’s computed ciphertext
c = AESkst (pref) and verifies the integrity by comparing if c
is equal to the reference ciphertext cref.
(3) In case the self-test is successful, an AES key ku is derived
after a user legitimates to unblock his encrypted device. A
key derivation is computed and the user key is automatically
passed to the FPGA.
Note that such an embedded system is not only a theoretical as-
sumption, since it is similar to the FIPS-140-2 level 2 certified USB
flash drive from Kingston, cf. the work of Swierczynski et al. [21].
4.3 Adversary’s Goal and Trojan Idea
The high-level goal of the adversary is to permanently burn the key
kst into the FPGA hardware configuration, so that the user-data is
always encrypted/decrypted with kst regardless of which key ku
is set by the user. This way, the adversary can, later on, decrypt all
seemingly securely encrypted user data. To accomplish this goal,
the adversary targets to attach a payload circuit to the existing
set-key circuit to permanently write the known key bits of kst into
the FFs that process k . Thus, the external self-test falsely confirms
the integrity of the FPGA AES IP core. To sum up, the described
Trojan can trick an external self-test in cases where the self-test
key is known like in [21].
4.4 Detection of Set-Key Circuitry
For our targetedAES core, we noticed that eight 16-bit shift-registers
were integrated into the hardware configuration. Its task is to tem-
porarily store the key received sequentially via UART and is later
on forwarded to the AES IP core, cf. Figure 6. For an attacker, the
key registers are an appealing target, as its alteration can, for ex-
ample, enable key extraction or Trojan insertion. Since our goal
is to burn a fixed key into the design, we first extract the relation
between a FF and the AES key bit and second override the cor-
responding parts of the hardware configuration that delivers the
(usually correct) key bit values. For that purpose, we developed
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a plugin to algorithmically detect deployed shift-registers and its
corresponding length, i.e., how many FFs are cascaded, within a
netlist.
FFFF
FF
k(127)
k(120)
LUT FFFF
FF
FF
LUT FF
FF LUT
FF
k(112) k(16) k(8) k(0)
k(7)k(15)k(23)k(31)
FFFF
k(121)
FFLUT FFFF
k(113) k(17) k(9) k(1)
8-bit
UART 
buffer
(key byte)
RX
Figure 6: 8 observed parallel 16-bit shift-registers sampling
one key byte from a repeatedly updated 8-bit buffer.
In order to reverse-engineer the relation between each FF and key
bit, we manipulate/clear the first pass-through LUT (in this case it
was always present, not shown in Figure 6) of a found shift-register
in the hardware configuration. By means of simulation2, we let the
hardware configuration compute a ciphertext for a known plaintext
and an AES key for which all 128 key bits are set. By comparing
the resulting FPGA ciphertext output with various pre-computed
known plaintext/ciphertexts pairs for suitable keys3, we can con-
clude the relation of each shift-register and the key bit position of
a key byte it processes. Note that we similarly determined whether
the first or last flip-flop of a shift-register store the key bit of the
first or last key byte. Having figured out which hardware primitive
is responsible for processing one segment of the AES key, we can
now describe the Trojan payload.
4.5 Manipulating a Set-Key Circuitry
The key idea is to detach any signal from the data input pin d of
each key bit FF and to attach the output signal from the so-called
payload LUTs, cf. Figure 6, so that all key-based shift-registers are
independent from the key buffer.
For the communication with our device an RS232 interface is
used, which receives the key byte by byte. Eight shift-registers are
used to store the bits of the current key byte during the loading
phase. Each shift-register itself can hold up to 16 values to store
all 8-bit chunks of a 128-bit key (key_byte in Figure 6). In total, we
added 128 payload LUTs and routed them to their target FFs, using
HAL. Of course alternative approaches may be used like for exam-
ple attaching GND or VCC signals to the corresponding flip-flops
inputs, but so far we did not reverse-engineer the corresponding bit-
stream encoding for those hardware elements. Each payload LUT is
programmed individually to output either 0 or 1 (depending on the
2Note that one may also manipulate the corresponding change in the bitstream and
observe the resulting ciphertexts through querying the AES module with several
known plaintexts. This way one can also conclude the relation between flip-flops
and key bits without conducting any simulation. For the sake of simplicity, we used
simulation.
3For example, we computed look-up tables with plaintext/ciphertext pairs for a key,
where the last bit of each of 16 key bytes was cleared, while all other key bits were set.
key bit kst). Overall, the functionality of the AESk (·) is substituted
by the malicious one, i.e., by AESk=kst (·).
FF
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8-bit
UART 
buffer
(key byte)
RX LUT
kkat(120)
FF
k(8)
kkat(8)
LUT FF
k(0)
LUT
kkat(0)
FF
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LUT FF
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Figure 7: Key-based Shift-register after IP manipulation.
We verified the correctness of our Trojan by setting a random
key k , kst and testing that the manipulated AES core nevertheless
computes AESkst (·) when encrypting one plaintext.
4.6 Stealthiness
Considering this Trojan, the self-test is rendered useless if only
one key kst is tested by the external entity. Furthermore, all user
data is encrypted with the known key kst instead of the derived
key ku making the decryption entirely possible. Note that in case
of an embedded device such as the Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash
drive [21], the user usually has no direct access to ku unless he
attempts to derive ku by himself, which requires exact knowledge
of the key derivation function. Certainly, once the user has access
to ku and obtains one plaintext/ciphertext pair, this Trojan can be
easily detected.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we demonstrated further attackers’ capabilities based
on the example of a malicious manipulation of a self-test protected
AES core. We improved the bitstream reverse engineering methods
by simplifying known routing extraction mechanisms. Thus we
conclude that the efforts for a successful bitstream conversion are
even lower than commonly assumed. Note that bitstream revers-
ing is also an essential step for legitimate purposes such as Trojan
detection, IP theft exposure, bitstream verification, or advanced
bitstream tooling. Further, we demonstrated the implication of par-
tial bitstream exposure. Combined with our Trojan case study, we
emphasized that key-based shift-registers can be exploited. The
identification of such points of interest is usually one of the various
practical hurdles during reverse engineering. For future projects,
one may also analyze how to algorithmically identify key registers
with more complicated hardware structures and whether partial bit-
stream reverse engineering is sufficient to carry out similar attacks.
Consequently, future research should explore defense mechanisms
for such vulnerable hardware structures, e.g., hardware obfuscation
methods.
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